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forces had to break out; "Westland" was neutral 
territory and McNaughton was under strict 
orders not to violate it (See Map 1). 
The best tank country was along the 
"Westland" border but contained barriers to 
manoeuvre such as the Grand Union and Oxford 
Canals and the Evenlode and Windrush Rivers. 
In the east there were additional significant water 
obstacles. The Thames River ran west out of 
London and forked at Reading, continuing 
northward while the westward extension turned 
into the Kennet River. The southeast portion of 
"Eastland" close on London was characterized 
by additional canals and built-up areas known 
as the Chiltern Hundreds.3 Thus terrain had an 
important role to play in the exercise. 
Though not a major issue at the time, postwar 
criticism by British and Canadian commentators 
of McNaughton's performance began with his 
select ion of pa r t i c ipa t ing u n i t s . As the 
commander of the British "Second Army" 
(facilitated by using the First Canadian Army 
Headquarters in the field for the first time), 
McNaughton was originally to command I 
Canadian Corps and two British corps, one of 
which was to be armoured.4 This changed when 
McNaughton substituted II Canadian Corps 
Headquarters, newly created on 15 January, for 
the British armoured corps. Second Canadian 
Corps, however, was severely deficient in signals 
equipment and had never conducted a staff 
exercise or a tactical exercise without troops 
(TEWT). 
For John English, who has offered the only 
in-depth analysis of McNaughton's role in the 
exercise, the question of II Canadian Corps' 
© Canadian Military History, Volume 8, Number 3, Summer 1999, pp.22-38. 23 
The large-scale General Headquarters (GHQ) exercise known as "Spartan," held in the 
south of England during March 1943, was a 
significant event in the history of the Canadian 
Army in the Second World War. The purpose of 
"Spartan" was to test the army in the dual tasks 
of breaking out of an established bridgehead and 
making the transition to open warfare. As a direct 
result of shortcomings on the exercise, three 
Canadian generals lost their commands. Of 
greatest significance was the eventual relief of 
General A.G.L. McNaughton as commander of 
the First Canadian Army in November 1943.1 
During and after "Spartan" the Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff (CIGS), General Sir 
Francis Alan Brooke, and the Commander-in-
Chief of Home Forces, General Sir Bernard Paget, 
claimed that McNaughton's performance proved 
his incapacity to lead First Canadian Army in 
the field. In consequence, Brooke and Paget 
orchestrated his removal and Canadian military 
historians have generally supported their 
assessment. However, the considerable criticism 
directed at McNaughton resulting from "Spartan" 
has suffered from oversimplification.2 This article 
will review McNaughton's performance during the 
exercise and assess its role in his relief. 
"Spartan," involving ten-plus divisions, was 
the largest field exercise held in Britain since 
Exercise "Bumper" in September 1941. For the 
exercise, most of southern England was divided 
into three areas: "Eastland," with its capital at 
Huntingdon, was a 'German' stronghold; 
"Southland," with boundaries extending to the 
outer defences of London (which was also under 
'German' control), was theoretically recently 
invaded by the Allies and served as the 
established bridgehead from which Canadian 
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teachings with messianic fervor. In fact, at El 
Alamein in October-November 1942, 
Montgomery created his own Corps de Chasse, 
X Corps, composed of 1st and 10th Armoured 
Divisions. He was ultimately dissatisfied with the 
results, announcing that "I do not agree with the 
policy of keeping Armd. Divs. in separate 
Corps."11 This observation was based on battle 
experience not exercises . I t seems tha t 
Montgomery's desert armoured experiences were 
not quickly disseminated, and may not have 
gotten back to Home Forces prior to "Spartan." 
McNaughton could have made I and II 
Canadian Corps more balanced with one infantry 
and one armoured division apiece, reducing his 
number of corps from three to two. But Crerar 
faced poor tank country in the centre and 
Stopford's zone near London offered little better 
prospect. In practice, Crerar failed to effectively 
employ even 1st Army Tank Brigade to maintain 
contact with enemy forces during the exercise.12 
McNaughton's options regarding the placement 
of the armoured divisions were thus limited by 
the terrain. It made sense to concentrate them 
on the left, where the ground offered better going, 
and there is little evidence to indicate that they 
would have been more effective elsewhere. 
As for placing both armoured divisions under 
the inexperienced Sansom, McNaughton really 
had little choice in the matter. The question of 
battle experience is one that haunted the 
Canadian Army throughout the war and it is true 
that Sansom knew little of armoured warfare. 
Yet none of the senior Canadian officers, 
inc luding Crerar , had any exper ience 
commanding armoured divisions in combat or 
even on exercise. Giving II Canadian Corps to a 
British officer with armoured experience was a 
possibility, but, it is fairly safe to say, not in 
McNaughton's eyes. 
McNaughton's objective was to seize 
Huntingdon as rapidly as possible and secure 
and develop airfields, something he did not think 
possible without first destroying the bulk of 
Gammel's forces. McNaughton knew that 
Gammel's forces were divided into two main 
groups and believed he could defeat each in detail 
if he could manoeuvre between them with 
Crerar's I Canadian Corps. This would also 
prevent Gammel from concentrating against him. 
25 
inclusion came down to simple feasibility. 
Without such fundamental preparation, he noted, 
"the training value of the corps' participation [in 
"Spartan"] was clearly questionable."5 Yet in his 
usually guarded form the Canadian official 
historian, C.P. Stacey, suggested that the rarity 
of such large-scale exercises made it "an 
opportunity not to be missed." Later in his 
memoirs Stacey voiced a more candid opinion, 
claiming that McNaughton's greatest mistake in 
"Spartan" was in "committing to it at all the green 
II Canadian Corps headquarters."6 McNaughton, 
and certainly Lieutenant-General H.D.G. Crerar, 
however, already had great confidence in the level 
of training in I Canadian Corps7 and McNaughton 
can hardly be blamed for trying to give II 
Canadian Corps some realistic large-scale 
training. Even Paget recognized the limited 
opportunity for big exercises.8 
McNaughton's final order of battle therefore 
included I Canadian Corps (2nd and 3rd 
Canadian Infantry Divisions and 1 Canadian 
Army Tank Brigade) commanded by Crerar, II 
Canadian Corps (Guards Armoured and 5th 
Canadian Armoured Divisions) commanded by 
Lieutenant-General E.W. Sansom, and XII British 
Corps (43rd and 53rd Infantry Divisions), 
commanded by Lieutenant-General M.G.N. 
Stopford. McNaughton ' s opponen t was 
Lieutenant-General J.H. Gammel, commanding 
the "German Sixth Army" of only two corps: 8 
Corps (9th and 42nd Armoured Divisions) and 
11 Corps (49th and 61st Infantry Divisions). 
McNaughton faced further post-war criticism 
for concentrating his two armoured divisions in 
II Canadian Corps to begin with, and then placing 
them under Sansom who had no armoured 
experience.9The ques t ion of grouping the 
armoured divisions in one corps needs context. 
Montgomery, who commanded the Southeastern 
Army prior to leaving for the desert in August 
1942, clearly had a powerful influence on 
Canadian army doctrine. In June of that year he 
drew attention to the lessons of Exercise "Tiger" 
and declared that although a well-balanced corps 
had two infantry divisions and one armoured 
division, an army commander could, as the battle 
progressed, "re-group his divisions, forming a 
Corps of two, or even th ree , a rmoured 
divisions."1 0 Such th ink ing was easily 
d isseminated to the Canadians because 
Montgomery was still in England and spread his 
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Cast of Characters 
Clockwise from top left: 
General Andrew McNaughton (left) and General Sir 
Alan Brooke [far right) confer with aides during a 
visit to Canadian troops in July 1940. 
Major-General J.H. Roberts (second from left), 
commander of 2nd Canadian Infantry Division and 
Lieutenant-General H.D.G. Crerar(far right), 
commander of I Canadian Corps meet during 
Exercise "Spartan, "10 March 1943. 
McNaughton (with binoculars) watches a tank battle 
take place from a 2-pounder anti-tank gun position 
during an exercise in May 1942. 
General Sir Bernard Paget, General Officer 
Commanding-in-Chief Home Force during a visit 
to a Canadian HQ during "Spartan, " 9 March 1943. 
Major-General E.W. Sansom (saluting) during a 
marchpast by the British Columbia Dragoons, 12 
March 1942. Sansom commanded II Canadian 
Corps during "Spartan. " 
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Gammel's preemptive move, fearing that XII 
British Corps could not be pushed northeast into 
line if Crerar was held up.17 Thus McNaughton 
deserves some credit for achieving speed at the 
outset and for taking the changed circumstances 
in stride. 
Throughout 4 March contact was made with 
Gammel's center and left. By first light on the 
5th Crerar had elements across the Thames at 
Sonning, and the 5th Canadian Armoured 
Division had crossed the Kennet River at 
Hungerford by 0800 hours. At 1030 hours 
Sansom was ordered to halt and occupy the 
Swindon-Hungerford area even though enemy 
forces had already withdrawn. McNaughton was 
cautious with his armoured divisions in the early 
stages, and Paget was rightly critical of him for 
leaving II Canadian Corps to guard the army's 
left flank throughout 6 and 7 March when the 
two opposing armoured forces were 50 miles 
apart.18 
At 0335 hours on 6 March McNaughton 
concluded that he was being held up by light 
forces and had yet to come to grips with the 
enemy's main body. Gammel had pivoted as 
intended on his left which produced severe 
fighting there, but withdrew his center and right. 
McNaughton decided to bring XII British Corps 
into play to continue the attack in relief of I 
Canadian Corps so Crerar could prepare for a 
suspected armoured counterattack.1 9 The 
advance of XII British Corps succeeded in 
breaking Gammel's pivot but enemy air action 
and the slowness of Stopford's move allowed 
Gammel to reform the pivot further back. 
Apparently, McNaughton had trouble 
deciding how best to proceed at this point. He 
had a host of visitors in the morning of the 6th, 
Air Marshals Sir Charles Portal and Sir Trafford 
Leigh-Mallory at 1030 hours, and Sir Archibald 
Sinclair, Secretary of State for Air, at 1140 hours. 
Most importantly, however, Paget and Sir James 
Grigg, the Secretary of State for War, showed up 
at 1245 hours. In a post war interview with 
Marian C. Long, Arthur Bryant's research 
assistant, Grigg recalled visiting McNaughton in 
his operations room and being appalled at his 
indecision. "Intelligence was coming in," Grigg 
stated, "and McNaughton stood in front of his 
situation map hesitating as to what to do and 
what orders to issue."20 
27 
Moreover, XII British Corps could not be 
concentrated until 48 hours after jumpoff (as per 
exercise rules), and since Sansom's II Canadian 
Corps was green, it made sense to lead off with 
his most experienced corps. McNaughton decided 
to advance straight on Huntingdon with Crerar's 
corps and have Sansom's armoured corps 
protect Crerar's left flank. 
Paget suggested in his comments issued soon 
after the exercise that the better course would 
have been to conduct the main advance with I 
and II Canadian Corps west of the Thames to 
threaten Gammel's line of communications and 
pry him out of successive positions, thereby 
avoiding a direct assault across a serious water 
obstacle.13 This was exactly what Gammel 
anticipated. His solution to being outnumbered 
was to erect a strong pivot in the Chilterns and 
swing back his right flank to the Thames-
Cherwell Rivers through Banbury and try to draw 
the "British" armour into the open area on the 
west covered by minefields and extensive 
demolitions. Then he would concentrate and 
counterattack McNaughton north of Banbury. 
Gammel had little desire to seek decisive 
armoured action until the situation was in his 
favour.14 McNaughton's plan then was a sound 
one and would have disrupted Gammel's 
defensive dispositions. 
The exercise commenced with GHQ 
presenting both commanders an unexpected 
situation to "test the flexibility" of their plans. 
McNaughton had not envisioned advancing before 
first light on 5 March, but GHQ allowed the 
Germans to move first. Gammel quickly pushed 
into "Southland" to gain much-needed depth and 
time to effect extensive demolitions, especially 
of bridges, well forward of his main position. It 
does not appear tha t McNaughton fully 
appreciated the effects of such a development.15 
At 0800 hours on 4 March, a day ahead of 
schedule, McNaughton was ordered to begin his 
advance as soon as possible. After speaking with 
Crerar and Sansom, he fixed the time to move at 
1200 hours that day. While Paget identified some 
confusion in the early stages of this accelerated 
movement, he stated that, "In view of the 
difficulties the speed with which the advance 
began was a most credible effort."16 In less than 
five hours McNaughton had his corps' moving 
and stuck to his original plan in the face of 
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At 0700 hours on the 7th McNaughton was 
up analyzing the bridging problems confronting 
the movement of Sansom's armour across the 
Thames. By midday McNaughton considered the 
situation unsatisfactory at Wallingford and 
Abingdon although the Shillingford bridge was 
nearly complete. Contrary to John Swettenham's 
misinformed assertion, McNaughton did not then 
rush off to the bridging sites. He never left 
headquarters the entire day and his war diary 
clearly proves this.23 He did go forward the next 
day at 1330 hours and returned to headquarters 
by 2040 hours. Yet the assumption has long been 
that McNaughton raced off to the bridging sites 
on the 7th and stayed there all day micro-
managing the efforts. On the contrary, on the 8th 
he did spend a little more than an hour at 
Pangbourne, Wallingford and Shillingford, but the 
rest of the day was taken up in visits to airfields 
and rear divisional headquarters.24 
Though McNaughton was not guilty of the 
excessive micro-managing often ascribed to him 
at this stage, his roaming at the front nevertheless 
obviously bothered Paget who felt that the 
tendency of commanders to go forward "must 
be curbed." As Paget explained, "Commanders 
on the higher levels can fight their battles only 
from their HQ where they are fully in the picture 
and have full signals facilities."25 One only has to 
read of the numerous routine forward visits in 
the diaries of Dempsey, Montgomery, Patton and 
a host of other senior commanders at a variety 
of levels to see that Paget's view was far too rigid. 
During the battle of France Guderian moved 
forward from XlXth Panzer Corps HQ and 
personally intervened to hurry tanks across the 
bridge at Gaulier on the outskirts of Sedan on 
the Meuse River.26 
At 0950 hours, 7 March McNaughton was 
visited by Alanbrooke and General Sir Ronald 
Adam, Adjutant General, for less than an hour. 
Brooke 's l ong-s t and ing anxie ty abou t 
McNaughton's command ability was reinforced 
by the morning visit. He noted in his diary at the 
time that McNaughton was "quite incompetent 
to command an army!" and "He does not know 
how to begin to cope with the job and was tying 
up his force into the most awful muddle."27 
Brooke was no doubt referring to McNaughton's 
passing Sansom's corps through Crerar's. 
Grigg's assessment may or may not reflect 
the reality of the situation, but McNaughton 
certainly had a lot to think about. McNaughton 
knew Gammel was trying to canalize the British 
armour along the "Westland" border and he 
wanted to keep the initiative by continuing to 
force Gammel to withdraw in front of Crerar in 
the centre. Moreover, sometime prior to 1630 
hours, 6 March (perhaps at 1130 hours when he 
was briefed by his GSO 1), McNaughton received 
a captured operations order from the 49th 
Infantry Division outlining its intention to 
withdraw from the area Wallingford-Abingdon. 
It also provided valuable intelligence on the future 
moves of the 61s t Infantry Division. 
McNaughton's subsequent decision based on the 
captured orders was the key factor in his eventual 
relief from command of First Canadian Army. 
At 1630 hours on 6 March McNaughton 
cancelled the relief of I Canadian Corps by XII 
British Corps and issued new instructions. 
Sansom, who was visiting Army headquarters at 
the time, was directed to move II Canadian Corps 
to an assembly area east of the Thames and 
prepare to move northeast to cut 11 Corps' lines 
of communication. It appears that McNaughton 
now intended to bring his armoured corps in 
between Crerar and Stopford to pursue the 
withdrawing enemy. To facilitate this new 
movement across the Thames, McNaughton 
directed that Class 40 bridges be built at 
Wallingford, Shillington and Abingdon by the 
afternoon of the 7th at the latest, less than 24 
hours away.21 
McNaughton's decision to move II Canadian 
Corps east across the Thames was harshly 
condemned at the time and subsequently because 
it entailed moving the corps across the lines of 
communication of I Canadian Corps at night. 
Moreover, it also would have put all three of his 
corps between Oxford and Reading on a frontage 
of only 30 miles. GHQ indicated that Gammel 
was retreating behind the Ouse River heading for 
the Grand Union Canal as of 0045 hours, 7 
March. As the exercise narrative stated, GHQ 
deemed it "essential" that McNaughton "should 
bring the enemy to battle with the maximum 
British force before he reached the canal 
position."22 The quickest way to close on the 
enemy was with an armoured advance, but 
Sansom's corps was not in position to execute 
McNaughton's strategy quickly. 
28 
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Top: Canadian Engineers of 
I Canadian Corps work to assemble 
a pontoon bridge across an English 
river during Exercise "Spartan. " 
Theoretically, the permanent bridge 
was "destroyed. " 
Right: One of numerous bridges 
constructed during "Spartan" has 
been finished allowing the advance 
to continue. 
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The concern with speed was a fair one, since 
II Canadian Corps was now re-aligned for a move 
east and had been preparing to do so for 24 
hours. The result of the counter orders was that 
in most cases units and lower formations started 
the move west up to three hours late. At 1930 
hours, 7 March, Guards Armoured Division 
began a 48 mile move to its first concentration 
area. By 0900 hours the next morning it arrived 
and waited almost ten hours for 5th Canadian 
Armoured Division to concentrate. The average 
speed of advance by the armoured divisions was 
a paltry five miles an hour. Stacey felt that the 
lack of speed by II Canadian Corps, and in 
particular 5th Canadian Armoured Division, was 
not surprising due to the lack of signals 
equipment and training of signals units. For 15 
hours the Corps was out of direct wireless touch 
with McNaughton's headquarters due to wireless 
silence. Personnel handling new types of sets for 
the first time did not help matters either.34 "It 
should moreover be remembered," Stacey added, 
"that this was the first occasion on which the 
whole of the 5th Division was actually exercised 
together as a formation."35 
The real problem, however, was traffic 
control. Between 1530 hours and 1730 hours 
on 8 March the administrative groups of Guards 
Armoured Division were mixed up with the 
fighting elements of 5th Canadian Armoured 
Division. At 1900 hours Guards Armoured 
moved on to its forward concentration area 
southwest of Banbury without waiting for 5th 
Armoured and arrived at 0600 hours 9 March. 
Movement remained sluggish due to the 
demolitions Gammel had prepared at the start 
of the exercise and the continued traffic 
problems. A major jam occurred throughout the 
9th when II Canadian Corps' rear areas were 
clogged with double lines of vehicles.36 At 1800 
hours McNaughton telephoned Sansom with 
orders to press on quickly. At 2000 hours both 
of Sansom's divisions had reached the Canal 
north of Banbury and prepared to turn in on the 
mass of Gammel's force. 
By 1600 hours March 10 Sansom's armour 
was finally in a position to threaten Gammel's 
force and was replenished by 3rd line transport 
at 1800 hours. Yet orders for a further advance 
were cancelled at 1830 hours.37 The narrative 
does not state by whom but the logical suggestion 
is Sansom not McNaughton, who was trying to 
In fact, by 1200 hours, 7 March McNaughton 
was rethinking this complicated move and 
considered an advance - rather than a screening 
operation - on the left with II Canadian Corps to 
Banbury. Several reasons may have provoked this 
re-evaluation. The "Spartan" narrative stated that 
the difficulty of moving II Canadian Corps across 
the rear of I Canadian Corps, and the risk of 
concentrating both corps between Oxford and 
Reading in a bottleneck with only four bridges, 
were factors which influenced his thinking.28 But 
if these were the reasons, it took McNaughton 
almost 20 hours to act upon them. Moreover, 
intelligence received at 1525 hours indicating that 
Gammel had ceased his withdrawal to the canal, 
no doubt reinforced his intention of pushing II 
Canadian Corps west, and additionally of trying 
now to effect a pincer movement with XII British 
Corps. Stacey stated that the "circumstances in 
which McNaughton changed his mind are not 
recorded,"29 but Brooke may very well have 
influenced the change during his visit through 
disapproving body language, tone, or outright 
suggestion of the difficulty of passing one corps 
through another. 
Whatever the circumstances, by 1605 hours 
McNaughton made the decision to push XII 
British Corps and I Canadian Corps north and 
northeast and II Canadian Corps west (See Map 
2). Paget s ta ted tha t this decision "was 
undoubtedly the correct one" because the best 
way to exploit superior forces was to stretch the 
enemy's front.30 Warning orders went out at 1615 
hours to Sansom and 1630 hours to Crerar and 
Stopford. Detailed written orders were issued at 
1740 hours. Apparently, Stopford was "reluctant 
to make so sudden a move"31 because he was 
not fully concentrated. McNaughton telephoned 
him at 2110 hours and "impressed upon him 
the necessity for determined advance."32 In 
pressing Stopford in this instance, and Sansom 
in subsequent situations, McNaughton clearly 
demonstrated that he possessed a measure of 
driving power even if his grip was at times 
questionable. Thus McNaughton was carrying out 
the plan Gammel had originally anticipated but 
Gammel's armour was no longer in position to 
decisively counterattack Sansom's spearheads. 
However, as the narrative stated, "It was 
problematical whether II Canadian Corps could 
advance with sufficient speed to gain the 
advantage."33 
30 
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tactically advanced and ba t t l e -hardened 
Germans. He and Montgomery had been appalled 
at the weaknesses in leadership of the BEF in 
France in 1940 and the question of finding 
su i tab le commanders s tayed with them 
throughout the war. It cannot be overstated how 
much the bitter experience of Dunkirk influenced 
them both . After Exercise "Bumper" in 
September 1941 Brooke knew the British Army 
was unprofessional and therefore in serious 
trouble. He noted in his diary that, "It is 
lamentable how poor we are as regards Army 
and Corps Commanders, we ought to remove 
several of them, but heaven knows where we shall 
find anything very much better."43 
Brooke's credibil i ty as a judge of 
commanders rested on more than his powerful 
position as CIGS. Though commanding the 
British II Corps in France in 1940 for only a short 
time, historians have given him high marks for 
the steady way in which he fought the retreat to 
Dunkirk. France was his only battlefield 
command during the war but nevertheless 
Brooke's stature was immense and one gets the 
impression of a very stable, fully modern mind 
at work relentlessly dedicated to rebuilding the 
British Army. Paget, on the other hand, never 
commanded a large formation in the field and 
pales beside the professionalism of Brooke.44 
McNaughton's professionalism, then, is a 
critical aspect of the "Spartan" manoeuvres. On 
the surface McNaughton could boast the standard 
credentials for high command. He attended the 
Staff College at Camberley in 1921 and received 
excellent evaluations. Major-General Hastings 
Anderson wrote of McNaughton at that time that 
he possessed a "wide general knowledge, and 
brings a highly trained, scientific mind to bear 
on all military problems." He also had a "good 
knowledge of staff duties."45 In 1927 McNaughton 
attended the Imperial Defence College to broaden 
his outlook, another prerequisite to high 
command. John English nonetheless suggests 
that the general impression historians have 
gained over the years is that McNaughton 
"dabbled superficially in the military art."46 
Concerning "Spartan," English concluded that his 
operational grip "reflected a lack of professional 
knowledge that could have been acquired through 
study."47 
urge II Canadian Corps forward instead of halting 
it. After searching for Stopford on the 9th to 
stress "the need for speed" from XII British 
Corps, McNaughton tried to communicate with 
Sansom from a No. 9 wireless set at 2330 hours 
to stress the necessity to move forward "as fast 
as humanly possible." It is not apparent that 
contact was ever made; communications were 
extremely poor.38 
On 11 March McNaughton realized that the 
pincer had failed and decided to have Sansom's 
Corps advance northeast on the left of Crerar's. 
In effecting this new assignment, Sansom took 
the incredible step of stripping 5th Canadian 
Armoured Division of its armoured brigade and 
exchanged it for the Guards Armoured Division's 
infantry brigade. Thus 5th Armoured, with 
infantry only, was tasked to hunt tanks and 
Guards Armoured, without infantry, was sent off 
in an advance. Such radical re-grouping had been 
severely criticized by Montgomery in previous 
exercises. McNaughton, when he heard of this, 
immediately did the right thing and sent off a 
message to Sansom at 0950 hours March 11 
order ing him to " re -es tab l i sh normal 
organization armd divs forthwith."39 This was 
impossible before 1800 hours and the result was 
the near destruction of the Guards Armoured 
armoured brigade, when, without infantry 
support, it attacked carefully selected infantry 
positions reinforced by substantial anti-tank 
assets.40 The next morning at 0900 hours ,12 
March, GHQ announced the cease-fire. 
A superficial examination of McNaughton's 
performance on "Spartan" would suggest that he 
had done moderately well because he was on the 
verge of achieving his objective when the cease-
fire sounded. Paget noted that after the 8th, "the 
situation swung steadily in favour of the British 
who had begun to overcome their handicap of 
their lines of communicat ion across the 
Thames ." 4 1 There is little g rounds for 
Swettenham's assertion that McNaughton 
displayed "superior generalship"42 but the 
ques t ion r e m a i n s : was McNaughton 's 
performance poor enough to warrant relief? 
Any discussion of McNaughton's performance 
must be considered in the context of Brooke's 
obsession with military professionalism. 
Brooke's first priority as CIGS was creating a 
battle-worthy field army capable of taking on the 
32 
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Above, right 82, below left: Various scenes of 
Churchill tanks from the Three Rivers Regiment 
taking part in Exercise "Spartan," 8 March 1943 
Below right: Two soldiers from Le Régiment de 
Maisonneuve during "Spartan." 
(Photos by Alexander M. Stirton) 
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It is evident from the testimony of a number 
of individuals that McNaughton devoted excessive 
amounts of time to the science side of war at the 
expense of leadership and training. Brigadier 
G.E. Beament, Brigadier, General Staff (BGS) of 
First Canadian Army, stated that McNaughton 
was too interested in weapons development,48 an 
opinion definitely shared by Brooke. Months after 
"Spartan" Paget told McNaughton personally that 
he was "too much absorbed on the technical side 
at the expense of training and command."49 
Brigadier N.E. Rodger, Guy Simonds' Chief of 
Staff, echoed Paget's criticism after the war.50 
Indeed, when Paget first visited McNaughton 
during "Spartan" on 6 March he was treated to 
an analysis of the Canadian high-velocity anti-
tank gun and the 120 mm mortar.51 
Hastings Anderson noted in his 1921 
assessment of McNaughton that he was perfectly 
capable of functioning either in command or staff 
duties "under conditions of modern war."52 
Liddell Hart, who befriended McNaughton just 
two years later, felt that during the Second World 
War he was a soldier of "outstanding vision and 
ability, who grasped the conditions of modern 
warfare earlier and more fully than most others"53 
However, McNaughton's grasp of armoured 
warfare does not appear to have been sharply 
honed by the time of "Spartan," even after four 
years of wartime training in England. 
Including the green II Canadian Corps in 
"Spartan," and giving the inexperienced Sansom 
command of both armoured divisions, hardly 
worked to McNaughton's advantage, but these 
decisions were not fatal sins. Nor do they suggest 
that he did not know what he was doing. 
Operationally, however, there were significant 
problems. In his operations order for 6 March 
he stated that "speed is essential.. .formations will 
be handled boldly and widely, full advantage being 
taken of possibilities of accelerating movement 
and action against the enemy, by proceeding 
across country."54 Yet remarkably, there were only 
three armour versus armour actions during the 
entire exercise, and two of those were initiated 
by Gammel even though McNaughton was the 
aggressor. Although McNaughton felt that in the 
first two days the formations and units "have 
been too deliberate in their procedure,"55 he never 
utilized his armour aggressively until the last 
days of the exercise and repeatedly lost contact 
with the enemy's main body. 
34 
This cer ta inly sugges ted cau t ion or 
operational amateurism and Brooke clearly 
would have looked d isparag ingly on 
McNaughton's inability to bring the enemy 
armour to battle. In commenting on Exercise 
"Bumper" in 1941, Brooke, then C-in-C Home 
Forces, stated that "The location and destruction 
of these armoured forces must be the main 
preoccupation of a commander, who must 
therefore understand fully the handling of his own 
armoured forces, which will be his main 
instrument for destroying those of the enemy."56 
There is little reason to suspect that he had 
changed his mind in this regard and it is logical 
to assume that the dexterous and effective 
employment of armoured forces was a critical 
criteria for him in judging success on "Spartan." 
McNaughton's failure in the handling of the 
armoured divisions thus probably stuck out 
prominently in the mind of a man who had 
thoroughly worked out his own thoughts on 
armoured warfare. 
McNaughton may have kept the weaknesses 
in training of his armoured divisions and 
Sansom's inexperience in mind when conducting 
operations. Montgomery stated in his "Main 
Lessons of the Battle" after El Alamein that 
commanders had to conduct operations "in 
keeping with the standard of training of his 
troops."57 But Montgomery took great pride in 
knowing his commanders and units intimately 
and thus was well positioned to make accurate 
judgements on their abilities. This same quality 
is not readily apparent in McNaughton because 
he simply never gained a good reputation for 
adequately training senior officers.58 In April 
1941 Brooke at tended a Canadian Corps 
exercise. McNaughton was sick and his Chief-of-
Staff, Miles C. Dempsey, showed Brooke around. 
In his diary Brooke recorded: "Rather depressed 
at the standard of training and efficiency of 
Canadian Divisional and Brigade Commanders. 
A great pity to see such excellent material as the 
Canadian men controlled by such indifferent 
commanders."59 
In the end, McNaughton's greatest mistake 
during the exercise was not, as Stacey suggested, 
including a green corps headquarters. His 
greatest error was the decision to pass II 
Canadian Corps through I Canadian Corps at 
night. Liddell Hart watched "Spartan" personally 
and commented after the war that "Unfortunately 
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things went wrong in the early stages, and a bad 
traffic j a m occurred in getting 2nd Canadian 
Corps t h r o u g h the bot t le-neck a rea a r o u n d 
Oxford." The principal fault, as he saw it, was 
not with McNaughton bu t with "Some of his chief 
subordina te commanders."6 0 There is no doubt 
t ha t S a n s o m was unskil led in the handl ing of 
a r m o u r e d divisions b u t the a r g u m e n t t h a t 
McNaughton was ill-served by his subordinates 
misses the essential point tha t the decision to 
shi f t t h e ax i s of I I C a n a d i a n C o r p s w a s 
McNaughton's alone. 
Liddell Hart apparent ly saw nothing wrong 
with this type of manoeuvre in the first place bu t 
Brooke obviously did. Brooke h a d been highly 
cri t ical of the fu ture Field Marsha l Harold 
Alexander for a laborious move of 2nd Canadian 
Infantry Division in the rear of 25th Army Tank 
Brigade dur ing Exercise "Bumper," an action 
w h i c h r o b b e d A l e x a n d e r o f o p e r a t i o n a l 
flexibility.61 Alexander survived "Bumper," b u t 
Brooke never felt comfortable with his ability. 
McNaughton's decision to pass II Canadian 
Corps t h r o u g h I C a n a d i a n Corps w a s b a d 
enough, b u t h is entire approach to operat ions 
revealed more ser ious weaknesses . Ordering 
countermoves created uncertainty and interfered 
with vehicle maintenance. For instance, at 1630 
hours on 6 March he ordered II Canadian Corps 
eas t across the Thames and a t 1615 hou r s the 
next day countermanded the order, directing the 
corps west. As Table 1 indicates, even his basic 
timings for normal operations the next day were 
far too optimistic to ensure orderly execution and 
u l t ima t e s u c c e s s . Obviously, McNaugh ton 
visualized what he wanted to do operationally in 
very shor t t imeframes, a bad trait for an army 
commander . As Paget correctly s ta ted in his 
comments, "Corps cannot be swung about on the 
battlefield like battalions and should be given at 
least 24 hours ' warning."62 In reality, they should 
be given even more time. 
Intimately connected with McNaughton's ill-
conceived timings was a ser ious problem with 
bridging. "Plans for bridging," Paget noted, "never 
caught up with the operations and were never 
more than one day ahead of the advance."63 The 
problem was simply that McNaughton never fully 
g r a s p e d the effect of G a m m e l ' s d a s h in to 
"Southland" and never recovered from this initial 
failure. Some 60 bridges were constructed by 
McNaughton's a rmy during "Spartan" of which 
only half were used. As the Chief Engineer of 
Home Forces noted, 
By far the greater part of the delay imposed on 
the British advance was accounted for by the 
time taken to deploy resources. In an advance a 
CRE [Commander Royal Engineers] must be 
planning for tomorrow; he must be able to look 
ahead 48 hours. The CE [Chief Engineer] of a 
Corps must be able to look ahead 3 days. The 
CE of an Army must be able to look ahead 4 
days at least. There must be a plan.64 
Paget felt tha t the repeated traffic j a m s were 
avoidable since "ample roads in both army areas 
and the density of movement was comparatively 
light" but "no army traffic plan was formulated."65 
Thus congestion and its corresponding negative 
effects on operations were inevitable. 
There is some evidence that McNaughton was 
never keenly interested in fully developing the 
capacity of the Army headqua r t e r s to function 
smoothly in the field. When such a t tempts were 
made on previous exercises, Brigadier Beament 
declared that McNaughton paid such efforts mere 
lip service.66 Moreover, Guy Simonds , the mos t 
professional soldier Canada produced during the 
war, dec lared u p o n eva lua t ing the va r ious 
"Spartan" reports that, "the main conclusions [of 
the C-in-C Home Forces] indicating weaknesses 
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Top left: English tankers surrender to soldiers from 
3 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA during Exercise 
"Spartan." 
Bottom, left: An "enemy" tank crew is captured by 
an armoured car crew from 7th Recce Regiment. 
British commanders had to go as well for the 
sake of combat efficiency, a fact which 
undermines the suggestion that McNaughton was 
relieved because he was Canadian.70 
The irony of the s i t ua t i on is t h a t 
McNaughton's replacement in command of First 
Canadian Army, Harry Crerar, had no battle 
experience either. His selection shows the dearth 
of high-ranking Canadian officers in place to 
assume important commands. Indeed, only Guy 
Simonds went through the logical sequence of 
commanding a division in combat in preparation 
for commanding a corps in combat and 
subsequently briefly commanding First Canadian 
Army. However, Brooke was genuinely more 
impressed with Crerar's professionalism than 
McNaughton's. During "Spartan" Brooke also 
visited Crerar and I Canadian Corps and noted 
that he had put on "a real good show" and had 
"improved that Corps out of all recognition."71 
Even Montgomery, no fan of Crerar 's in 
Normandy, noted of a mid-1942 exercise that the 
"Canadians did splendidly, and were well 
commanded by Crerar."72 
McNaughton knew that "Spartan" was designed 
to assess the physical endurance of the troops 
and their proficiency in tactics, but he also 
characterized it as "a strict test...of the ability of 
commanders and staffs to administer, handle and 
fight their formations and units."73 Stacey 
suggested that McNaughton probably never even 
cons idered "the possibi l i ty t h a t a poor 
performance by the army might reflect on 
himself"74 b u t th i s seems un rea l i s t i c . 
McNaughton did not have to exhibit Napoleonic 
brilliance but a solid performance would have 
gone a long way to solidifying his position as 
commander of First Canadian Army. His lack of 
professionalism was readily apparent during the 
exercise, however, and the entire episode must 
be placed within the context of Brooke's earnest 
desire to prepare the army for the return to the 
continent of Europe. 
in organiza t ion and training. . . [were] 
substantiated by events during the exercise."67 
Thus, after three and a half years of training in 
England, McNaughton's skill in directing an army 
was simply not up to standard. 
Brooke had been concerned with 
McNaughton's leadership since 1941. In his 
"Notes for My Memoirs," Brooke wrote that "The 
more I saw of the Canadian Corps at that time 
the more convinced I became that Andy 
McNaughton had not got the required qualities 
of command. He did not know his subordinate 
commanders properly and was lacking in tactical 
outlook. It stood out clearly that he would have 
to be relieved of his command."68 Brooke felt 
strong enough about McNaughton's professional 
weaknesses to declare that, "I felt that I could 
not accept the responsibility of allowing the 
Canadian Army to go into action under his 
orders."69 Brooke also recognized that several 
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